By Farah Zia

The recent bloody violations across LoC have proved that the project peace between India and Pakistan remains fragile as ever. Such is the baggage of history that one incident has the capacity to bring down the gains achieved in years. Mercifully, the reaction on the Pakistan side to the LoC killings was much delayed because of some volatile developments within the country and, when it did come, it was subdued and sensible to the extent that it forced the other side to eventually reciprocate in peace terms.

While the temperature seems to have gone down, and it looks as if the two neighbours would return to a state of normalcy, this might as well be a moment of reckoning.

Ever since the Mumbai attacks of 2008, Pakistanis had feared that some such incident would foreclose the possibility of normalcy. Now that it has come and gone, it might be an opportune time to assess the worth of peace process or composite dialogue or whatever we thought we had achieved out of it. It might be instructive to see if the process of engagement has the capacity to stand on its own feet or whether local politics and vested interests have the capacity to derail it at the slightest provocation.

This necessitates a dispassionate look at the chain of events as they happened which becomes a tad difficult when you talk to analysts in one country only. This becomes doubly difficult because there is opaqueness about the happenings on the LoC; we are dependent on facts and information from the ground and there is no independent mechanism to ascertain it. So, how many soldiers got killed and did the beheading take place remain subjects of conjecture, especially when there is no third party to investigate.

This is an attempt to get a sense of how the events are looked at in Pakistan. Imtiaz Alam, secretary general Safma, sums it up: “There have been violations of LoC even before this. The matter became more serious this time because there were allegations of beheading of an Indian soldier. The reaction was built up by the [Indian] media and the government came under pressure.”

Arif Jamal, senior journalist and author of Jihad in Kashmir: The Untold Story, also thinks the violation was significant this time. “It is definitely the first time that the Indians have alleged that Pakistan army soldier had beheaded an Indian soldier and took away the beheaded soldier’s head. In the past, [Haibat Khan of] the LeT (Lashkar-e-Taiba) and HuJI (Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami) are known to have beheaded Indian soldiers and put their heads on display in Pakistan.”

He refers to the many Indian journalists who have reported (or did so in the past) that the Indian soldiers had beheaded the Pakistani soldiers some time back: “However, it did not create so much crisis and tension between the two countries.”

So, why so much fuss for something that has also happened in the past. Alam thinks the context is important which, in his words, is that Pakistan had delayed the decision of according India the MFN status. “In between, Hafiz Saeed went up to Wagah in the form of a rally against this decision. Generally, there was consensus on MFN and the only objection that came was from agriculturists and the Karachi Chamber of Commerce. As per the decisions, the MFN status would become effective from Dec 31, and the negative list which is substantially reduced will be released in January. This was in line with the Safta framework. The cabinet had given the approval but its implementation was stopped because there were some non-tariff barriers affecting Pakistani exports and India was believed to be dumping some goods. So, the chambers on both sides got involved and engaged and thoroughly discussed these problems.”

Whatever was decided is now part of the trade policy for the next five years which has been presented before the parliament and the MFN is part of this bill, says Alam.

The JuD rally against the MFN status notwithstanding, Alam thinks the Pakistan military was on board regarding the MFN. So the million dollar question is: if MFN was the context of the skirmishes and the Pakistan army had no objections, then who did it from our side. Alam thinks this could be the work of one of the many lashkars operating along the LoC. “There is a sense in Islamabad that in that sub-zero temperature and fog, it is quite possible that the lashkar may have acted on both sides.”

Jamal agrees to the extent that “there is a pattern of state and non-state actors sabotaging the peace efforts in the subcontinent in the past. It was usually thought that the Pakistani military was behind those efforts. However, on the face of it, the Pakistani military had been recently supporting the peace efforts with India. Moreover, the military was also shifting its focus from Indian to internal threats.”

He thinks whoever did this aimed at sabotaging the peace efforts. “If the Indian allegations were true, it would show that there is no consensus within the Pakistani military on the Pakistan-India peace process. If the Indian allegations are not true, it would show that anti-peace forces are also active in India as well.”

When asked about the current level of infiltration, Jamal concedes the anti-Indian jihadi groups are opening working in Pakistan and the infiltration on the LoC is also taking place. “However, this is unlikely to be a key factor in the current tension as it has been happening since always and the infiltration level is at its lowest in 25 years.”

Political Scientist Hasan Askari-Rizvi agrees about the autonomous agenda pursued by the militant groups in Pakistan but he does not exclude the belligerent role of the Indian military in the current crisis. “When it comes to India-Pakistan relations, the clout of Indian army has increased [vis-a-vis other stakeholders]. It has the capacity to subvert or at least slow things down.”

In that respect, does the Indian army have the same problem as its Pakistani counterpart? “Yes, it is not in favour of engaging with Pakistan which, it believes, is a failing state and when the Indians talk with Pakistan, it emerges as an equal partner,” says Rizvi.

In doing so, the military gets support from extremist parties like the BJP and RSS, just like the Pakistan army gets the support of Islamist groups, says Rizvi. And this is where the Indian domestic political context comes into play. This time too, the issue of peace was politicised in India, says Imtiaz Alam, because there are important state elections coming up. “The Congress aims to take on the BJP because it wants to lure the Muslim voters.”

With no Qadri in the capital or a 100 Hazara killings to distract the Indian media, it over-reacted. The expose about the terrorist camps being run by the BJP and RSS could well be a counter-offensive by the Congress party which has led to a new infighting and has engaged the media elsewhere now.

So, has the current crisis conclusively derailed the peace process or just slowed it down. Arif Jamal thinks: “It may not end the peace process but it has definitely slowed it down. Demand for peace exists in both countries although pro-peace forces are quite weak in Pakistan. There is a strong faction in the Pakistani business community which rightly believes that peace would bring more dividends to Pakistan than to India. Given the regional and international strategic situations, the two countries have to pursue the peace process even if they have to move in circles.”

Hasan Askari-Rizvi is also of the view that since the Indian government is under a lot of pressure, the process has slowed down “but the Congress will revive it after some time. At the moment, it is cautious because it does not want others to exploit the situation”. As for Imtiaz Alam, “With time normalcy will return. Indian foreign minister Salman Khursid has responded positively to the offer of talks. But India should not have put a stop to people-to-people contacts. This is irrational”.