Cost of conflict VI: A profitable conflict


Cost of conflict VI: A profitable conflict

Missionaries of death offer poor young men attractive monetary packages to join militant outfits. Motivators, who bring young men into what they tout as ‘jihad’, are paid per every recruit they induct, while the indoctrinators of this “righteous path” make millions
By Semu Bhatt

Every protracted conflict gives rise to vested interests that benefit from the continuation of conflict. The Indo-Pak case is no different. It has given rise to a massive conflict economy that thrives on the bilateral hostility of these two nations. The formal component of this conflict economy is expressed in terms of the military expenditure; the informal component is expressed in terms of the terror economy. For those who think that jihadis fight for a “cause”, all you need is to take a hard look into the massive money that goes into recruiting, training and sustaining them.

To explore the socio-economic conditions that lead young men to walk the terror path and the brainwashing that hardens their minds into believing that they are fighting a religious war would require a separate article. What we are touching upon here is that missionaries of death offer poor young men attractive monetary packages to join militant outfits. Motivators, who bring young men into what they tout as ‘jihad’, are paid per every recruit they induct, while the indoctrinators of this “righteous path” make millions.

Terror Economy

It is impossible to ascertain the exact size of the terror economy flourishing because of the Indo-Pak conflict. However, it is possible to make approximate calculations based on data available through ground level interviews. The following table shows the cost to the system for launching 1,000 armed fighters and I am steering clear from defining the ‘system’ here simply to avoid any finger pointing that can hijack the discussion from the crux of the matter.

Thus, the total cost of inducting and maintaining militant fighters comes to INRs536 million a year. This does not include the cost of running training camps and extra arms and ammunition involved in major terrorist operations. The infiltration of these armed fighters in Kashmir comes at a price too. In every incursion, a batch of militants is accompanied by guides who help navigate the difficult terrain, and porters to carry the arms and equipments – the annual cost of infiltration coming to INRs345 million. During the peak of insurgency, nearly 800 incursions were reported into Kashmir annually. For the past few years, this number has gone down to nearly 450-500 passages annually.

Over and above these expenses, a lot of money goes into rewarding fighters for significant acts of terror. For example, killing a major from the Indian army fetches INRs10, 000, killing a lieutenant colonel brings INRs50, 000 and a dead brigadier is worth INRs100, 000. A similar rate pyramid is applicable to terror attacks on Indian infrastructure as well. According to sources, a couple of thousand millions are also rewarded annually to the organisations active in Kashmir to keep the paradise burning and for recruiting and training local militants.

Terror Funding

There are three major unofficial sources of funding that run the militant machinery. The first and foremost source is through collection of donations or through extortion in the name of ‘jihad’ in various countries. Charitable fronts of extremist organisations gather funds from their supporters to continue the ‘jihad’ in Kashmir, and their militant wings extort money from businessmen and affluent people. The leaders of these organisations are believed to keep 50 per cent of the earnings – about INRs50 billion a year.

A sizeable chunk of funding also comes from the INRs2, 500 billion illegal narcotics business of Afghanistan. Even at a miniscule 0.1 per cent of this money, the poppy economy pumps in nearly INRs2.5 billion into the Kashmir proxy war. However, the most detrimental source of funding from Indian perspective is through fake Indian currency notes (FICN). FICN worth Indian Rupees (INR) 120 to 130 million is pushed into India every year to finance terrorism in Kashmir and considerable disruption of the Indian economy as a fringe benefit in this. Terror economy also has shares in crime, smuggling, illegal arms trade, kidnappings and other clandestine activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan. There are also sources that agree to free supply of arms and ammunition, equipments, clothing and ration, thereby indirectly funding the terror economy.

Cost-benefit ratio

The visible gross terror-economy product of Kashmir looks miniscule when the heavy economic costs it exacts on the Indian side, as well as the large number of Indian troops it manages to engage in counter insurgency operations, are taken into account. The terror economy is not only based on illegal means and erode the official economies of the two countries, but also supports the exploitation of young men from poor background by funding their recruitment for death missions. And most importantly, the fact that a parallel terror economy worth billions of rupees has sprung from the bilateral hostility throws up an unpleasant truth – that the parties to this economy have a billion dollar interest to ensure that India and Pakistan continue stay on the war path.

The writer is an independent analyst on security and governance issues and co-author of ‘Cost of Conflict between India and Pakistan’ (International Centre for Peace Initiatives, Mumbai, 2004). Email: [email protected]

Cost——————Amount per——————–Total cost per year head (in INRs) for 1,000 fighters* (in INRs million)

Initial payment———–200,000—————————200

Training——————-50,000—————————–50

Yearly remuneration

(10K per month)———120,000—————————120

Clothing——————-6,000——————————6

Arms———————–50,000—————————-50

Motivator—————–10,000—————————-10

Relief to families of the

militants killed————200,000————————–100**

Total—————————————————-536

* On an average, the number of militants in Kashmir remains in a small band of around 3,000 – inclusive of the local militants, who form nearly 30 per cent of the active militants. Foreign militants are known to exit once they carry out the job assigned to them and then re-enter again for another assignment; hence the calculations are based on a pool of 1,000 fighters.

**Over the years, incursions have come down and so has the number of militants killed in Kashmir – from nearly 1,000 in 2004 to nearly 250 in 2009. The cost of relief in the table is for 500 dead militants

—————-Number———————- Number per year———– Amount paid Amount per year

—————-per passage (500 passages per head (in INRs million) per year)

Guides——-4—————————–2,000————————60,000——-120

Porters——30—————————15,000———————15,000——-225

Total————————————————————————————–345




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